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THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW:
TOO MUCH LAWYERING AND TOO
LITTLE DIPLOMACY
CURTIS A. BRADLEY*

The standard view of the Bush Administration’s relationship to
international law is something like this: The Administration did not
take international law seriously and routinely disregarded it whenever
it was thought to conflict with the national interests of the country. In
doing so, the Administration substantially undermined both the rule
of law and the United States’ standing in the international community.
Consequently, one of the priorities of the Obama Administration
should be to recommit the United States to compliance with
international law and its institutions.
In support of this view, critics of the Bush Administration invoke a
variety of examples. First, the Administration withdrew from two
treaties—the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia, and the
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,
which gave the International Court of Justice in The Hague
jurisdiction over certain disputes relating to the arrest of foreign
nationals in the United States. Second, the Administration allegedly
took the unprecedented step of “unsigning” the treaty establishing the
International Criminal Court. Third, the Administration concluded
that it would not apply the protections of the Geneva Conventions to
terrorist detainees, including the detainees held at the Guantanamo
Bay naval base in Cuba. Fourth, the Administration announced a
military preemption doctrine, a doctrine that many international
lawyers think exceeds the international law right of self-defense. Fifth,
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the United States invaded Iraq in early 2003—an action that many
regard as a violation of fundamental international law norms
governing the use of force. Finally, the Administration allegedly
authorized torture of terrorism suspects, in violation of treaty
obligations and other international responsibilities.
This long bill of particulars certainly gives the standard view of the
Bush Administration’s relationship to international law some
plausibility. Nevertheless, as I will explain, the standard view is both
too simplistic and in some ways the reverse of the truth. As an initial
matter, this view omits from its description some affirmative
contributions that the Administration made to international law.
More importantly, this view glosses over the fact that the
Administration almost never directly repudiated international law
and in many cases advanced perfectly respectable legal arguments to
support its controversial actions.
In light of these complications, I will suggest a lesson from the
Bush Administration’s relationship with international law that is
different from the standard view: Most of the problems associated
with the Administration’s approach to international relations did not
result from a failure to treat international law as law. In fact, in some
respects the problems were the result of the opposite—the
Administration was too focused on the law and failed to take
adequate account of other, non-legal considerations that are often
central to good diplomacy. The situation improved during President
Bush’s second term, as the Administration became more pragmatic,
and less legalistic, in its approach to international law.
At the outset, it is important to note that the Administration made
affirmative contributions to particular areas of international law.
Consider, for example, the area of nuclear non-proliferation, one of
the most important issues in the world today. The Administration
played a leadership role in pushing other nations to comply with and
help enforce the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and one of the
Administration’s major foreign policy successes was to persuade
Libya to agree to give up its nuclear program.1 It also worked with the
United Nations Security Council to craft several key resolutions

1. David E. Sanger & Judith Miller, Libya to Give Up Arms Program, Bush Announces,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/20/world/libya-to-giveup-arms-programs-bush-announces.html.
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responding to nuclear activities by North Korea and Iran.2
Furthermore, it helped launch the “Global Partnership Against the
Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction,” to which it
3
provided billions of dollars in funding.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the Bush Administration also made
significant contributions to international law concerning counterterrorism and criminal law enforcement. After the September 11
attacks, the Administration worked with the Security Council to
establish a Counter-Terrorism Committee, which has focused on
restricting the financing of terrorist organizations and making sure
4
that nations extradite or prosecute terrorists. Concerns have been
raised about some of the processes used by that Committee, but it is
nevertheless an important development in the area of international
law dealing with terrorism. After September 11, the United States also
persuaded other nations to support the concept of a self-defense right
in the context of terrorism.5 In terms of law enforcement more
generally, the United States helped negotiate and conclude important
treaties on subjects such as cybercrime and organized crime.6
It is true, of course, that the Administration adopted a number of
controversial positions relating to international law. But most of these
positions did not involve repudiations of international law. Indeed,
most of the Administration’s positions involved perfectly respectable
legal arguments, and sometimes even involved an almost obsessive
attention to international legal process. The one exception may be the
Administration’s approach to the international law on torture, which I
will discuss in more detail below.
Consider first the Administration’s treaty withdrawals.
International law generally allows nations to withdraw from treaties,

2. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1718, ¶¶ 1, 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1718 (Oct. 14, 2006)
(condemning North Korean nuclear tests and demanding that North Korea retract its
withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons); S.C. Res. 1803,
¶¶ 5–8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1803 (Mar. 3, 2008) (applying trade and other restrictions against Iran
for refusing to suspend its uranium-enrichment and heavy-water-related projects).
3. See Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: G-8 Summit—Preventing the
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/
official_docs/pres/62702.WMD.pres.pdf (outlining the G-8’s political and monetary commitment
to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction).
4. S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1372 (Sept. 28, 2001).
5. S.C. Res. 1368, pmbl. U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001).
6. Convention on Cybercrime, Council of Europe, Nov. 23, 2001, 41 I.L.M. 282,
2296 U.N.T.S. 167 (ratified by the United States in 2006); United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 15, 2000, 40 I.L.M. 334, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209.
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subject in some cases to a notice requirement.7 Moreover, the AntiBallistic Missile Treaty expressly includes a right of withdrawal upon
six months notice,8 which the Bush Administration provided prior to
9
withdrawing. The Administration explained to Russia that the treaty,
which was originally concluded with the Soviet Union in 1972 during
the height of the Cold War, no longer made sense in light of changed
world conditions: the United States and Russia cease to rely on
mutually assured nuclear destruction as a cornerstone of their foreign
policy, and the danger that rogue states or terrorists would acquire
nuclear weapons has increased.10 This is hardly a frivolous position,
and the Administration was acting in accordance with the treaty’s
withdrawal provision in articulating it.
The other treaty from which the United States withdrew, the
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,
did not specifically address withdrawal. But it has generally been
understood that such jurisdictional treaties are subject to
withdrawal.11 Indeed, many nations have changed or withdrawn their
consent to the International Court of Justice’s jurisdiction during the
12
last sixty years since the Court was created. Although the Bush
Administration withdrew from this treaty in 2004, it sought to comply
with a judgment of the International Court of Justice that had been
issued before withdrawal by taking the somewhat surprising step of
ordering its state courts to provide new hearings for foreign nationals
in certain death penalty cases.13 The Supreme Court ultimately held in
Medellin v. Texas that the Administration did not have the domestic

8. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems art. 15, U.S.-U.S.S.R.,
May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435.
9. George W. Bush, Remarks Announcing the United States Withdrawal from the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 37 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 1783 (Dec. 13, 2001).
10. See id. (“Today, as the events of September the 11th made all too clear, the greatest
threats, to both our countries come not from each other or other big powers in the world but
from terrorists who strike without warning or rogue states who seek weapons of mass
destruction.”).
11. See, e.g., ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 291 (2d ed. 2007)
(“It will usually be possible to withdraw from a general treaty for the settlement of disputes
between the parties even when it has no withdrawal provision.”).
12. See id. (“[S]tates have withdrawn from such optional dispute settlement protocols to
several United Nations treaties without (at least legal) objection, even when they contain no
provision for this; and declarations under Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice (which is an integral part of the UN Charter) can be, and have been, withdrawn.”).
13. See Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1353 (2008) (referring to President Bush’s
memorandum to the Attorney General charging state courts to “give effect” to the
International Court of Justice’s decision).
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authority to issue this order.14 Whatever this episode might reveal
about the Administration’s conception of executive power, it does not
reveal an administration simply ignoring international law.
What about the United States’ “unsigning” of the International
Criminal Court treaty? Nations typically join multilateral treaties
such as this one through ratification, which traditionally requires
depositing an instrument of ratification with the United Nations. A
nation’s signature on such a treaty does not make the nation a party;
the signature only suggests (at most) that the treaty is acceptable to
the nation’s executive branch. It is understood that in many nations,
including in the United States, legislative approval may be required
before the nation can actually join the treaty.15
The Clinton Administration signed the treaty establishing the
International Criminal Court on December 31, 2000, about two weeks
before President Clinton left office.16 President Clinton stated that he
had some significant reservations about the treaty and did not expect
the United States to move towards ratification any time soon, but he
thought it nevertheless important for the United States to be a
17
signatory. In 2002, the Bush Administration sent a letter to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations stating that the United
States did not intend to become a party to the treaty and that there
should be no continuing legal effects associated with the Clinton
Administration’s signature.18
The Bush Administration did not attempt to physically remove
the U.S. signature from the treaty. It merely announced its intention
not to become a party to the treaty. This act was not only perfectly
legal under international law, it actually followed the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which governs topics such as
signing and withdrawal from treaties, to the letter. Article 18(a) of the
Convention provides that if a nation has signed a treaty, it is obliged
not to engage in acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the

14. Id. at 1367–72.
15. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Unratified Treaties, Domestic Politics, and the U.S.
Constitution, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 307, 313 (2007).
16. See William J. Clinton, Statement on the Rome Treaty on the International Criminal
Court, 37 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 4 (Dec. 31, 2000) (statement of the President on December
31, 2000, detailing the treaty and the United States’ reasons for signing it; President Clinton
vacated office in January, 2001).
17. Id.
18. See Curtis A. Bradley, U.S. Announces Intent Not to Ratify International Criminal
Court Treaty, ASIL INSIGHTS, May 2002, http://www.asil.org/insigh87.cfm#_edn4.
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treaty “until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a
party to the treaty.”19 It is hard to imagine a way to make a country’s
intention clearer than to send a public letter to the United Nations
Secretary-General, who serves as the depository for many multilateral
treaties, including the International Criminal Court treaty.
One can of course debate the policy wisdom of disassociating the
United States from the International Criminal Court, an institution
currently supported by over 100 nations. The central concern of the
United States, expressed by both the Clinton and Bush
Administrations, was that the Court could be used as a political device
against the United States through biased investigations and
20
prosecutions relating to United States military activities abroad. This
concern may be overblown given a variety of safeguards in the
treaty.21 But the key point is that the Bush Administration did not
contravene or disregard international law; rather, it carefully followed
international law governing “unsigning.” Nor, it should be noted, did
the Bush Administration oppose all international criminal law
enforcement. It was a significant supporter of the International
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the
Special Court for Sierra Leone, and it even acquiesced in the Security
Council’s referral of the Darfur genocide case to the International
Criminal Court.22 The Bush Administration therefore was not
antagonistic to international criminal law, but instead simply had
particular concerns about the structure of the International Criminal
Court, concerns that also had been expressed by the Clinton
Administration.
Another example that is supposed to show the Bush
Administration’s disregard of international law is the
19. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 18(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
20. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 18 (quoting the Bush Administration’s concern that the
International Criminal Court lacks any “effective mechanism to prevent politicized prosecutions
of American service members and officials”); Statement on the Rome Treaty on the
International Criminal Court, supra note 16 (including among President Clinton’s concerns
“protect[ing] U.S. officials from unfounded charges”).
21. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 17, 20, July 17, 1998,
27 I.L.M. 999 (regulating the discretion of the prosecutor in bringing cases before the
International Criminal Court).
22. See, e.g., Michael Abramowitz & Colum Lynch, Darfur Killings Soften Bush’s
Opposition to International Court, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2008, available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/11/AR2008101101964.html; Warren
Hoge, U.N. Votes to Send Any Sudan War Crime Suspects to World Court, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 1, 2005, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0DE4D8103
FF932A35757C0A9639C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all.
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Administration’s detention policy in the War on Terror, which critics
have argued violates the Geneva Conventions. The Geneva
Conventions are four treaties that were negotiated after World War II.
The treaty that is most often discussed in the context of the War on
Terror is the Third Geneva Convention, which addresses the
treatment of prisoners of war (POWs).23 The Bush Administration’s
position has been that this treaty does not apply to the conflict with
Al Qaeda and that, although it does arguably apply to the conflict
with the Taliban in Afghanistan, Taliban fighters do not qualify for the
24
protections accorded under the treaty to prisoners of war.
The Administration’s position at least with respect to the
worldwide conflict with Al Qaeda has a strong legal basis. The Third
Geneva Convention for the most part applies only to conflicts with
25
contracting parties, and Al Qaeda is not a contracting party and does
not itself observe the Convention. Importantly, even in this context
the Administration did not ignore or attempt to minimize the
importance of the Geneva Conventions. Indeed, President Bush’s
February 2002 memorandum announcing the U.S. position with
respect to the applicability of the Conventions to the War on Terror
made clear that the United States “has been and continues to be a
strong supporter of Geneva and its principles,” and that, even though
the detainees were not technically entitled to the protections of the
Conventions, the United States would, “to the extent appropriate and
consistent with military necessity,” treat the detainees “in a manner
consistent with the principles of Geneva.”26
The Administration’s legal position with respect to the Taliban is
more debatable than with respect to Al Qaeda, since Afghanistan is a
party to the Convention and Taliban fighters served as the ruling
government’s armed forces there. The language of the Third Geneva
Convention suggests that a contracting party’s armed forces
automatically qualify for POW protection, whereas militias and
irregular forces need to meet certain requirements such as wearing
uniforms, having a command structure, and complying with the laws

23. Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
[1955] 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention].
24. Memorandum from President George W. Bush to Vice President Dick Cheney et al.,
Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees, ¶ 2d (Feb. 7, 2002), available at
http://www.pegc.us/archive/White_House/bush_memo_20020207_ed.pdf.
25. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 23, at art. 2.
26. Memorandum from George W. Bush, supra note 24, ¶¶ 1, 3, 5.
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of war in order to qualify for POW protection.27 However, law of war
treaties that predate the Geneva Conventions, and which the
Conventions built upon, provide some support for the conclusion that
the Conventions’ reference to a party’s armed forces implicitly
includes those requirements, in which case the Taliban would have to
comply with them in order to qualify as POWs.28 This was the
Administration’s position, and it is at least plausible. In addition to
having some historical support, this reading would provide an
incentive for regular forces to follow these requirements and thus, for
example, adequately distinguish themselves from civilians, which is a
fundamental component of the laws of war.
I do not mean to suggest that it was wise for the Administration to
adopt this interpretation with respect to Taliban fighters, and, indeed,
my view is that the Administration would have been wiser to embrace
more of the Geneva Conventions than it thought was technically
required. This is what the United States government did during the
Vietnam War—voluntarily applying the Geneva Conventions even to
irregular Viet Cong fighters.29
In any event, it is important to keep in mind that even if the
Taliban fighters were entitled to POW protections, the Third Geneva
Convention would not bar their detention. Under that Convention,
prisoners may be held until the end of hostilities,30 and there continues
to be fighting between the United States and the Taliban even today.
So, even if the Administration violated the Geneva Conventions with
respect to specific actions such as coercive interrogations or military
27. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 23, at art. 4(A)(1)–(2).
28. See, e.g., MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS:
COMMENTARY ON THE TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS
OF 1949 at 234–35 (1982) (“It is generally assumed that these conditions were deemed, by the
1874 Brussels Conference and the 1899 and 1907 Hague Peace Conferences, to be inherent in
the regular armed forces of States. Accordingly, it was considered to be unnecessary and
redundant to spell them out in the [Geneva] Conventions.”); INGRID DETTER, THE LAW OF
WAR 136–37 (2d ed. 2000) (expressing similar view); United States v. Lindh,
212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 557 n.34 (E.D. Va. 2002) (same).
29. See GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945 at 363 (1994) (detailing the United
States’ application of the Geneva Conventions during the Vietnam War).
30. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 23, at art. 118 (“Prisoners of war shall be
released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.”); see also
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“It is a clearly established
principle of the law of war that detention may last no longer than active hostilities.”);
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism,
118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2096 (2005) (“[B]oth lawful combatants who qualify for prisoner-ofwar status and unlawful combatants who do not can, under the laws of war, be detained until the
end of active hostilities.”).
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tribunals, its general detention policy is not necessarily at odds with
the Conventions.
There are two provisions in the Third Geneva Convention that
pose special issues concerning U.S. compliance. First, Common
Article 3, a provision iterated in all four Geneva Conventions, confers
certain minimum protections on individuals detained in an armed
conflict occurring in the territory of a contracting party, and does not
31
apply only to conflicts between contracting parties. This Article,
however, is limited to “conflicts not of an international character,”32
and, until 2006, the Bush Administration’s position was that the
conflicts, both between the United States and Al Qaeda, and between
the United States and the Taliban, were international conflicts
because they were not simply internal to a nation.
The Supreme Court ultimately disagreed with this reading of
33
Common Article 3 in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. The Court concluded
that “international” conflicts meant conflicts between nations—international—rather than cross-border, and thus that the conflict with Al
Qaeda was not of an international character, since Al Qaeda is not a
34
nation. The Administration’s position, however, was reasonable as a
legal matter, and indeed finds support in the original International
Committee for the Red Cross commentary on Common Article 3,
which suggests that it covers only internal conflicts such as
insurgencies and civil wars.35 In any event, Common Article 3 does not
call into question the Administration’s general detention policy, as
opposed to its use of military tribunals.
The other provision in the Third Geneva Convention that poses a
special issue is Article 5, which provides that when there is any doubt
about whether captured individuals qualify for POW status, they shall
be treated as POWs until their status is determined by a competent
36
tribunal. In failing to provide such competent tribunal hearings to

31. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 23, at art. 3(1)(A) (listing prohibitions against
“violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and
torture”).
32. Id. at art. 3.
33. Hamdan v. Rumseld, 548 U.S. 557, 630–31 (2006).
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON III
GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 37
(Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960) (stating that the conflicts covered by Common Article 3 are conflicts
that “take place within the confines of a single country”).
36. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 23, at art. 5.
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captured Taliban fighters, the Administration took the fairly
aggressive position that, since the Taliban as a class did not wear
adequate uniforms and did not comply with the laws of war, there was
37
no need for individualized hearings about POW status.
There is a certain logic to the Administration’s position: Why have
individualized hearings when the problem with POW status was legal
rather than factual? Nevertheless, this is another instance where the
Administration probably should have embraced more of the Geneva
Conventions than it thought was technically required, since the cost of
these hearings would have been low and the Supreme Court
eventually required the Administration to provide individualized
hearings anyway. The State Department’s Legal Adviser did argue
within the Administration for POW status hearings for people
38
captured in Afghanistan, but his advice was rejected. This rejection
occurred in 2002 at a time when there was a tense relationship
between the State Department and the Office of Legal Counsel
(OLC) over War on Terror issues. John Yoo of the OLC had informed
the State Department that the OLC believed that the Geneva
Conventions had no application in either Afghanistan or the War on
Terror more generally, reasoning, among other things, that
Afghanistan was a “failed state” and thus no longer effectively a party
to the Conventions.39 In response, Will Taft, the State Department
Legal Adviser at the time, sent a long memo to John Yoo critiquing
the OLC’s analysis, and Taft included a note stating that “the most
important factual assumptions on which your draft is based as well as
its legal analysis are seriously flawed.”40
President Bush never invoked the “failed state” theory that had
been proposed by the OLC, which suggests that the State

37. Memorandum from President George W. Bush to Vice President Cheney et al,
Humane Treatment of Taliban and al Qaeda Detainees, ¶ 2d (Feb. 7, 2002), available at
http://www.pegc.us/archive/White_House/bush_memo_20020207_ed.pdf.
38. Memorandum from William H. Taft, IV, Legal Adviser to the Department of State, to
Counsel to the President, Comments on your Paper on the Geneva Convention (Feb. 2, 2002),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/packages/html/politics/20040608_DOC.pdf.
39. Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Department of Defense, Application of
Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 9, 2002), available at
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.09.pdf.
40. Memorandum from William H. Taft, IV, Legal Adviser to the Department of State, to
John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Your Draft
Memorandum of January 9 (Jan. 11, 2002), http://www.torturingdemocracy.org/documents/
20020111.pdf (last visited May 20, 2009).
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Department’s dialogue with the OLC did have an effect, even during
this tense period. The key point, again, is that the Administration as a
whole was taking express account of international law and was
ultimately adopting plausible interpretations of that law.
Still another controversial example of the Administration’s
treatment of international law is the Bush Doctrine on military
preemption. In September 2002, the Bush Administration issued a
policy paper that expressed the view that nations have the ability to
take preemptive military action to prevent the use of weapons of
41
mass destruction. Some commentators have argued that this position
violates the Charter of the United Nations, a treaty established in
1945 that is binding upon essentially all nations, including the United
42
States.
Article 51 of the Charter recognizes the inherent right to use
43
military force in self-defense in response to an armed attack, but it
does not expressly contemplate the use of force to preempt an
44
attack. Nevertheless, there is a plausible argument that Article 51
leaves some room for preemptive military measures. In stating that
“[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense,” Article 51 suggests that the
Charter is not intended to override the historic right of self-defense.45
That historic right arguably includes a right of anticipatory self46
defense in response to imminent threats. Interestingly, the
Administration specifically invoked this historic right under
customary international law as justification for its policy of
preemption. The policy paper on the use of preemptive force stated,
for example:
For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not
suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend
themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of
attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned

41. THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES
AMERICA (2002), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/
nss-020920.pdf.
42. See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, What Happens Now? The United Nations After Iraq,
97 AM. J. INT’L L. 607, 620 (2003).
43. U.N. Charter art. 51.
44. See id. (referring only to a right of self-defense in the event of an armed attack).
45. U.N. Charter art. 51 (emphasis added).
46. E.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS
AND ARMED ATTACKS ch. 7 (2002).
OF
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the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent
threat—most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air
forces preparing to attack.
We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities
and objectives of today’s adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists
do not seek to attack us using conventional means. They know
such attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terror and,
potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction—weapons that
can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without
47
warning.

This argument may or may not be convincing, but it is an argument
that expressly attempts to work with, rather than ignore, international
law.
We move into even more controversial terrain when we consider
the Administration’s justifications for the Iraq War. It is important to
note that the Bush Doctrine on preemption, although announced
prior to the Iraq War, was not the Administration’s principal legal
argument justifying the war. This is fortunate for the Administration,
since weapons of mass destruction were never actually found in Iraq.
The principal legal argument, rather, was based on Security Council
48
resolutions. Under international law, a nation may use military force
49
against another nation either in self-defense or with the
authorization of the United Nations Security Council.50
The Security Council had authorized the use of force against Iraq
51
in the Gulf War in 1991, after Iraq invaded Kuwait. After coalition
forces expelled Iraq from Kuwait, the Security Council issued a
ceasefire resolution that was dependent upon Iraq’s compliance with
a variety of conditions.52 These conditions included destroying various
types of weapons, agreeing not to develop certain weapons, respecting
designated no-fly zones, and subjecting itself to inspections and
monitoring for compliance with the outlined conditions. Several years
passed and Iraq repeatedly breached the terms of the cease-fire

47. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 41, at 15.
48. George W. Bush, U.N. General Assembly in New York City Address (Sept. 12, 2002),
38 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 1529 (Sept. 16, 2002).
49. U.N. Charter art. 51.
50. U.N. Charter art. 42.
51. S.C. Res. 678, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990).
52. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 3, 1991).
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resolution.53 At times, United States and British forces retaliated
through air attacks on select facilities, with no complaint from the
United Nations.54 Furthermore, Iraq was so uncooperative in
complying with the mandatory inspections that the inspectors
abandoned their efforts and left Iraq in 1998. Following their
departure, the Clinton Administration, along with forces from Great
Britain, orchestrated a three-day bombing campaign designed to
reduce Iraq’s ability to develop weapons of mass destruction.55
Inspections were later resumed, but again there were significant
problems with Iraqi cooperation. In November 2002, after weeks of
drafting and negotiation, the Security Council issued Resolution 1441
stating that Iraq was in “material breach” of its obligations under
56
prior resolutions. Resolution 1441 gave Iraq a “final opportunity” for
57
compliance and stated that failure to comply would result in “serious
consequences.”58 In the months preceding the Iraq War, there
continued to be difficulties with Iraqi cooperation, although the
extent of these difficulties is contested.
In light of this history, there was a respectable legal argument that
the Security Council’s original authorization of force was reinstated in
light of Iraq’s material breaches of the ceasefire resolution and
subsequent resolutions. The Security Council seemed to envision this
possibility in its use of phrases such as “final opportunity” and “facing
59
serious consequences” in Resolution 1441. In fact, Resolution 1441
was issued by the Security Council in November 2002, just one month
after Congress publicly authorized President Bush to pursue a war in
Iraq should the violations continue. To be clear, my own view is that
the case against legality is somewhat stronger than the case for
legality. But the case for legality is not insubstantial, and it is too
simplistic to say that the Administration was simply disregarding
international law.
53. See BARRY E. CARTER, PHILIP R. TRIMBLE, AND ALLEN S. WEINER, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 1058 (5th ed. 2007) (detailing Iraq’s breaches of Security Council resolutions).
54. See William H. Taft, IV, & Todd F. Buchwald, Preemption, Iraq and International Law,
97 AM. J. INT’L L. 557, 559–60 (2003) (outlining several 1990s military campaigns against Iraq
and arguing for their legality).
55. See id. (detailing operation “Desert Fox” aimed at Iraq).
56. S.C. Res. 1441, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (Nov. 8, 2002) (listing in the preamble
several examples of Iraq’s “material breach” of resolution obligations including not cooperating
with weapons inspectors and not making significant disclosures of weapons programs).
57. Id. ¶ 2.
58. Id. ¶ 13.
59. Taft & Buchwald, supra note 54, at 563.
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The final example to consider, and probably the most
controversial issue involving the Bush Administration’s treatment of
international law, is that of torture. The United States has been a party
to the Convention Against Torture since 1994, and many courts and
commentators believe that torture also violates unwritten norms of
international law.60 In a memo that was subsequently leaked to the
press, the OLC infamously adopted in August 2002 a very narrow
definition of torture, reasoning that for an act to constitute torture,
the resulting physical pain must be “equivalent in intensity to the pain
accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure,
impairment of bodily functions, or even death,” and for mental harm
to constitute torture, “it must result in significant psychological harm
61
of significant duration.”
The August 2002 memo contains problematic legal reasoning,
especially because the OLC failed to take adequate account of how
other parties to the treaty understand torture. Nevertheless, although
the existence of this memo may tell us a lot about problems with the
OLC culture during this period, I do not think it warrants general
claims about the Administration’s relationship with international law,
for several reasons.
First, unlike essentially all other international law decisions made
by the Bush Administration, the analysis in this memo did not involve
any participation by the State Department, which is the part of the
Executive Branch with the most expertise on international law. The
lack of consultation with the State Department concerning an
important issue of international may itself be worthy of
condemnation, but it was not a characteristic of any of the other
issues discussed in this essay. Second, despite some broad and
unnecessary analysis in the memo about how President Bush had the
domestic power to authorize torture, the President never in fact
claimed such a power and in fact insisted that any instances of torture
62
should be prosecuted. That is, the President did not attempt to

60. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883–85 (2d Cir. 1980) (concluding that
torture, when carried out by a government actor, violates customary international law).
61. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel
to the President, RE: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A
(Aug. 1, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB (Karen J. Greenberg &
Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005), also available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/etn/
gonzales/memos_dir/memo_20020801_JD_%20Gonz_.pdf.
62. See, e.g., George W. Bush, Statement on United Nations International Day in Support
of Victims of Torture, 40 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 1167, 1167–68 (July 5, 2004)
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override, or simply disregard, international law. Attempting to read a
legal prohibition narrowly may be problematic, but it is not the same
thing as disregarding the prohibition or treating it as if it were not law.
Third, unlike other controversial international law positions advanced
by the Administration, the Administration did not stand by the
analysis in this memo once its flaws became apparent—instead, the
Department of Justice withdrew the memo and replaced it with a
much more defensible analysis in 2004.63 This further suggests the sui
generis nature of the torture issue.
The Administration’s actual practice with respect to torture
deserves some further explication. We can all recall the abuses that
came to light at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, which, if not torture, at
the very least involved degrading treatment of prisoners.64 Whatever
this abuse may tell us about lapses in the chain of command, however,
the prisoners’ treatment was not the direct result of any
Administration position regarding international law: the
Administration accepted the applicability of the Third Geneva
Convention in Iraq from the start.65 The Convention bars all
mistreatment of prisoners, not just torture, and some soldiers were
criminally prosecuted for the Abu Ghraib abuse. Similarly, it is far
from clear that the interrogation techniques authorized for use at
Guantanamo, the most aggressive of which involved isolation and
changing sleep patterns, amount to torture (which the Convention
Against Torture defines as involving the intentional infliction of
severe pain and suffering).66
So did the Administration ever authorize torture? Reports suggest
that the CIA was authorized to use so-called “enhanced”
interrogation techniques against a number of high-level Al Qaeda
(“America stands against and will not tolerate torture. We will investigate and prosecute all acts
of torture.”).
63. Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A, Op. Att’y Gen.
(Dec. 30, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/18usc23402340a2.htm.
64. See, e.g., Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, THE NEW YORKER, May 10, 2004,
available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/05/10/040510fa_fact (detailing the abuses at
Abu Ghraib).
65. U.S. Dept. of Defense, News Transcript, Defense Department Background Briefing
(May 14, 2004), http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040514-0752.html (last visited
May 20, 2009).
66. News Release No. 596-04, U.S. Dept. of Defense, DOD Provides Details on
Interrogation Process (June 22, 2004), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod/
nr20040622-0930.htm; Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense for the Commander, U.S.
Southern Command, Counter-Resistance Techniques in the War on Terrorism (April 16, 2003),
available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod/d20040622doc9.pdf.
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detainees, including slapping, forced standing for long periods, light
and noise bombardment, and, for three of the detainees,
waterboarding.67 Of these enhanced techniques, many people consider
68
at least waterboarding to constitute torture. If so, then the
Administration did violate international law in those select instances,
although the CIA had been given reason to believe, based on the
problematic OLC memo, that the technique did not violate the
international ban on torture. But, by themselves, these individual
instances no more elucidate the Bush Administration’s general
relationship with international law than, for example, President
Clinton’s bombing campaign in Kosovo (which also probably violated
international law) tells us about the general relationship of the
Clinton Administration to international law.
***
In sum, despite caricatures about the Bush Administration’s
failure to treat international law as law or ignoring it altogether, the
Administration actually made some important contributions to
international law and generally—although admittedly not always—
adopted defensible international law positions with respect to its
controversial actions.
One might respond to these points by contending that even if the
Administration did not disregard international law, it nevertheless
displayed a lack of “good faith” towards international law. It is far
from clear, however, that the concept of good faith is violated simply
because a nation decides not to be a party to particular international
instruments or institutions, or decides not to embrace the most
expansive interpretations of their scope—actions that could instead
simply reflect a good faith policy disagreement. To the extent that the
charge of bad faith assumes that having more, and more expansive,
international rules is always better for the world, this is at best an
under-defended assumption. Moreover, a charge that the
Administration did not apply international law in a sufficiently robust

67. Greg Miller, CIA Chief Confirms Use of Waterboarding, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2008,
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/feb/06/nation/na-terror6; Jon Ward & John
Solomon, Interview of the Vice-President, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2008, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040514-0752.html.
68. See, e.g., Poll Results: Waterboarding is Torture, CNN.COM, Nov. 6, 2007,
http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/11/06/waterboard.poll/ (“Asked whether they think
waterboarding is a form of torture, more than two-thirds of respondents, or 69 percent, said
yes.”).
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way is a different charge, and is less obviously an inherent indictment,
than the more common charge that the Administration ignored
international law or did not take it seriously as law, especially since
the Administration generally made at least plausible international law
arguments.
Despite these contentions, my goal here is not to applaud the
Bush Administration’s approach to international relations more
generally. I will concede that there were significant problems with the
Administration’s approach to international relations, especially during
the Administration’s first term, but my argument is that these
problems did not particularly involve a disregard for international
law. Instead, I shall go even further and suggest that the problem at
times was that the Administration was too focused on law and that it
neglected other non-legal considerations that are at least as important
in the international arena.
One of the lessons from the Bush Administration, I want to
suggest, is that the importance of international law does not lie solely,
or even chiefly, in technical legal argumentation. Instead, it is
intertwined with less legalistic considerations of credibility,
engagement, and persuasion—considerations that are fundamental to
the exercise of what Joseph Nye has famously called “soft power.”69
Soft power is the ability to have other nations support or acquiesce in
your policies without being induced by either military or economic
pressure or rewards—that is, by resorting to hard power.70 This soft
power strategy does not always work, of course, but when it does it is
generally a much less expensive way of obtaining foreign policy
success than using hard power.71 Moreover, hard power is more costly
and less effective if it lacks broad international support, something
painfully illustrated when comparing the original Gulf War to the
current Iraq War. To be sure, it is helpful to have diplomacy backed up
by hard power, but good diplomacy also requires patience,
understatement, and a willingness to listen, and those qualities were
often in short supply in the Bush Administration.
Instead, the Bush Administration, especially during the first term,
often gave the impression that it did not need to explain itself or

69. See generally JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD
POLITICS (2005).
70. E.g., id.
71. Id. at 5.
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listen to others. It lashed out not only at adversaries, but also at allies
that disagreed with it. This is illustrated by Secretary of State Donald
Rumsfeld’s dismissive reference to France and Germany as “old
72
Europe” and by David Addington, Vice-President Cheney’s counsel,
repeatedly remarking in meetings that foreign governments “don’t
have a vote.”73 The Administration also appointed John Bolton as
Ambassador to the United Nations despite his open hostility to the
institution. Furthermore, the Administration did not just decline to
join the International Criminal Court treaty but actively sought to
undermine the Court by pressuring countries that had joined it to
make agreements that were arguably inconsistent with their
obligations under the treaty.74
In relying on technical legal arguments about the Geneva
Conventions, the Administration did not sufficiently take account of
the symbolic value of the Conventions. It therefore neglected an
opportunity to adopt positions that might be more generous than are
compelled by a narrow reading of the law and thus to exercise a form
of moral leadership. Its treatment of the Geneva Conventions also
illustrated how the Administration was quick to find gaps in the law
but slow to fill those gaps. Particularly when dealing with potentially
indefinite detention, this situation of “no law” was not going to be
acceptable either to our allies or to the courts, and good lawyers, as
well as good policymakers, should have foreseen that.
The problems associated with the Administration’s excessive focus
on law likely extend well beyond international relations. Although the
rule of law promotes important values, framing questions in legal
terms can sometimes produce undesirable outcomes, even in the
domestic realm. Among other things, when the focus is on what the
law allows, there may be an insufficient focus on the underlying policy
and moral questions, and there may be undue deference to lawyers,
who may lack relevant policy or moral expertise. This is arguably what

72. Outrage at “Old Europe” Remarks, BBC NEWS ONLINE, Jan. 23, 2003,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2687403.stm (last visited May 20, 2009).
73. JACK L. GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 126 (2007).
74. E.g., James Crawford, Philippe Sands & Ralph Wilde, Joint Opinion, In the Matter of
the Statute of the International Criminal Court and In the Matter of Bilateral Agreements
Sought by the United States Under Article 98(2) of the Statute (June 5, 2003), available at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/international_justice/Art98_061403.pdf.
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happened as the Bush Administration began crafting its approach to
the War on Terrorism.75
The Administration performed better on these “soft power” issues
in President Bush’s second term. The State Department’s Legal
Adviser, John Bellinger, gave a number of important speeches abroad
both confirming United States support for international law and
explaining and defending in some detail the Administration’s specific
76
positions on questions of international law. He even bravely
appeared before the U.N. Committee Against Torture in 2006 to
77
address criticisms of U.S. practices. The Administration also was
more receptive to dialogue, even with adversaries such as North
Korea and Iran, a big change from its “axis of evil” speech.78
None of this is to suggest that the United States should concede
away its fundamental interests or values in order to please other
countries. Presidents, regardless of their party affiliation, presumably
will not do that. For that reason, my guess is that those who are
assuming that President Obama will have radically different
substantive positions on foreign policy than Bush may be
disappointed. But process and tone also matter a great deal in
international relations, and those considerations probably will change
for the better in the Obama Administration, just as they started to
change for the better in President Bush’s second term.

75. See, e.g., Philip Zelikow, Legal Policy for a Twilight War, 30 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 89, 92
(2007) (arguing that the Bush Administration, prior to 2006, focused too much on what it could
do in the War on Terror under international law and not enough on what it should do).
76. See, e.g., Press Release, John B. Bellinger, III, Embassy of the U.S. in London, Lecture
at the Univ. of Oxford, Prisoners in War: Contemporary Challenges to the Geneva Conventions
(Dec. 10, 2007), http://www.usembassy.org.uk/ukpapress72.html (last visited May 20, 2009).
77. Tom Wright, U.S. Explains Itself to U.N. on Torture Charges, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2006,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/05/world/05cnd-rights.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=
bellinger%20torture%202006&st=cse.
78. See, e.g., Helene Cooper, North Korea Is Off Terror List After Deal with U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/12/world/asia/
12terror.html?scp=2&sq=bush+north+korea+six+party&st=nyt; Helene Cooper & David E.
Sanger, A Talk at Lunch that Shifted the Stance on Iran, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2006, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/04/world/middleeast/04iran.html?scp=20&sq=bush%20dialogu
e%20iran%202006&st=cse.

